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Abstract: In the literature on member state position taking in the eurozone crisis, the 
debate has mainly centred on whether national preferences are shaped exclusively 
within the domestic setting or influenced by shared EU-level norms or interaction 
within EU institutions. This article goes beyond this discussion. Drawing on original 
data collected by the authors, it uses the UK’s experience to test the claims both of 
society-centred approaches, including liberal intergovernmentalism, and perspectives 
that emphasise the importance of shared EU norms or interaction. It argues that, 
while the first overlook the role of institutions as both actors and mediating variables 
in preference formation, the second rely have so far focused on the experience of 
eurozone members thereby raising the possibility of selection bias. Treating eurozone 
form as a series of processes rather than a single event, it contests the claim that 
preference formation is always driven by societal interests, highlights instances where 
government acts in the absence of or contrary to expressed societal interests, and 
reveals limitations of the shared norms critique of liberal intergovernmentalism. It 
shows that the UK government was driven by concern to protect the UK economy 
from financial contagion rather than solidarity with its European partners. 
 
The positions taken by governments in response to the eurozone crisis provide 
an important testing ground for competing theoretical approaches to preference 
formation. Although liberal intergovernmentalism (LI) remains the ‘baseline 
theory’ for many (Naurin 2018), critics highlight as problematic its assumption 
that the domestic arena is insular and emphasise the influence of the wider EU 
context and shared EU norms in shaping national preferences (Csehi and Puetter 
2017, Hall 2012, Zimmerman 2014, Schirm 2016, 2018). Yet the role of top 
officeholders or institutions in deciding national responses to the eurozone crisis 
has not yet been fully explored.  
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This article sets out to assess the claims of both LI and its critics through an 
analysis of the UK’s role during the eurozone crisis. We argue that although 
powerful economic interests (the City of London) were important, they did not 
always actively mobilise around the issue and the government frequently 
adopted preferences at odds with them. We offer two explanations for this. First, 
during the early phase of the sovereign debt crisis, UK government preferences 
were developed relatively autonomously by a small group of senior ministers 
and officials close to the Prime Minister and the Chancellor. Second, as the crisis 
unfolded, however, important political interests – namely, Parliament and the 
Bank of England – became central to the definition of UK preferences on 
eurozone reform. Importantly, the UK’s preferences shifted over time, from a 
position of deliberately distancing the UK from the crisis, to trying to re-set 
relations with the EU. But we find little concern for EU norms or solidarity.   
 
We make a threefold contribution to the existing literature. First, while LI 
emphasises a bottom-up view of preference formation in the eurozone crisis, this 
paper follows scholars who have highlighted the importance of political 
institutions and strategic calculation by governmental actors (Zimmerman 
2014). Drawing on the ‘old institutionalism’ (Rhodes 2017), which highlights the 
role of political institutions as actors, it argues for the centrality of government 
agency and the importance of domestic institutional contexts in accounting for 
government positions. This top-down perspective stresses that at time 
governments have significant autonomy from organised societal interests. 
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Second, the paper challenges the ‘new institutionalist critique’ (NIC) (Van de Ven 
and Hargrave 2004: 260) of LI, which asserts from several theoretical 
perspectives that government preferences are increasingly shaped by EU 
institutional norms or orientations. The existing literature focuses on the 
experience of euro area members without investigating whether shared norms 
extend to eurozone ‘outs’. Our evaluation of EU norms in the context of the UK 
therefore represents a ‘tough case’ for NIC. Finally, although ‘big country’ studies 
of France (Rothacher 2015), Germany (Bulmer 2014, Hall 2012,) and Italy (Bull 
2018) exist, analysis of the UK’s role during the eurozone crisis remain relatively 
sparse (Schelkle 2016 and Thompson 2017 are exceptions).  
 
The article uses process tracing to examine the development of the UK’s position 
in four areas, to provide a cross-section of policy cases: emergency measures for 
Greece, a permanent bailout facility for the eurozone, the fiscal compact, and 
Banking Union. Our rationale is that the eurozone crisis and eurozone reform 
need to be analysed as a process or processes, rather than an event. The analysis 
of public documents, industry reports and media coverage from this period is 
supported by eight anonymous interviews with UK politicians, civil servants, and 
financial institutions.  
 
The discussion is organised into three parts. The first critically reviews LI and 
other bottom-up approaches, together with the NIC perspective, related to the 
eurozone crisis. The second section defines our empirical expectations to be 
tested in the paper. The third section undertakes a process tracing of UK 
preferences across each of the four cases, before summarising our main findings. 
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Theorising preferences, preference formation and position taking in the 
eurozone crisis: a critical overview 
 
Three main theoretical perspectives have been applied to explain national 
responses to the eurozone crisis: liberal intergovernmentalism (LI) (Moravscik 
1993, 1997, 1998); a societal approach (Schirm 2016, 2018); and a ‘new 
institutionalist’ critique (NIC) (Puetter 2014, Bickerton et al 2015). We review 
each in turn. 
 
LI and preference formation 
 
LI assumes that governments act purposively in the international arena, but 
emphasise the critical role of societal actors in defining government preferences 
(Moravcsik 1997: 516). Defining preferences as ‘the fundamental social purposes 
underlying the strategic calculations of governments’ (Moravcsik 1997: 513. 
Emphasis added), LI characterises national preferences as socially constructed 
and changeable, rather than as fixed and exogenous. Its explanation rests on 
classical pluralism. Preferences emerge through domestic political conflict: 
groups compete for influence by articulating their interests, and governments 
respond to these demands by aggregating them (Moravcsik 1993: 481-3). Hence, 
‘[s]ocietal ideas, interests, and institutions influence state behaviour by shaping 
state preferences’ (1997: 513). In intergovernmental negotiations, the 
government therefore ‘represent[s] some subset of domestic society’ (1998: 
518).  
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LI’s pluralist foundations have been widely critiqued. Although Moravcsik (1993: 
488) suggests that sectoral issue interdependence creates incentives for groups 
to mobilise, little consideration is given to the conditions under which a 
government will balance these against other electoral, ideological, partisan or 
political considerations. Moreover, LI is largely silent on the causal significance 
of the particular political or institutional channels through which societal 
interests are transmitted to government. In other words, it downplays the 
mediating role played by institutions in privilege some societal interest over 
others (Schattschneider 1960, Tarrow 1996). It similarly overlooks how the 
powers of different branches of government influence outputs (Eckstein 1979), 
or how interests and ideas embodied in state institutions shape decision making 
(March and Olson 1989). 
 
More broadly, LI lacks a coherent theory of the state: i.e. an account of the 
organisational structure, constitutional rules, established traditions, and 
accumulated history of the domestic polity. While Moravcsik makes reference to 
the ‘executive’, there is no account of how governments interact with 
legislatures, judiciaries, or state bureaucracies. The distinction between 
ideational, commercial and republican sub-variants of liberalism could be 
interpreted as an attempt to recognize and accommodate cross-national 
differences ‘linking social preferences and state behaviour’ (Moravcsik 1997: 
515). But these categories are insufficiently fine grained to capture how macro-
institutional variation in political systems (e.g. presidential vs. parliamentary, 
majoritarian vs. consensual) shape government preference formation. 
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Our critique of LI is rooted in ‘old institutionalism’ (Rhodes 2011) which 
emphasises the constitutional, political, administrative and symbolic resources 
available to the main branches of government. From this perspective, political 
institutions do not simply act as a conduit for societal groups, but are capable of 
acting autonomously in ways that can directly contradict powerful (economic) 
interests (Nordlinger 1981). It is our contention that cross-national differences 
in how power is distributed within national polities, electoral pressures rooted 
in inter- and intra-party competition, and the influence of well-resourced 
bureaucratic organisations are critical for explaining government preferences 
during the eurozone crisis (see Zimmerman 2014).  
 
The societal approach 
 
The ‘societal approach’ shares LI’s emphasis on domestic societal interests, but 
also underlines the role of institutions and ideas (Schirm 2016, 2018). It defines 
institutions: ‘as formal regulations, which structure domestic political and socio-
economic coordination… [It] includes long-term complementarities resulting 
from domestic regulations that might shape governmental positions towards 
global governance’. Drawing on historical institutionalism and the ‘varieties of 
capitalism’ (VOC) literature (Hall 2014), Schirm (2016: 68) suggests that 
government positions are ‘informed by their calculations of how international 
rules will affect their ability to sustain designs that are the foundation of 
economic groups’ competitive advantages’ (Schirm 2016: 68). Ideas, meanwhile, 
are defined ‘as path-dependent and value-based collective expectations about 
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appropriate governmental policies’. Societal ideas can express themselves in 
‘practices’, defined as the long-term behavioural expressions of ideational 
predispositions, which shape the construction of societal interests (Schirm 2016: 
68). 
Although the societal approach addresses important limitations of LI, there are 
other plausible conceptualisations. From the perspective of ‘old institutionalism’, 
for example, institutions are actors with political and legal resources, not 
regulations. Also, the institutions highlighted by the VOC literature may account 
for routine policymaking, but others may be more important at times of crisis 
(Hall 2014). At the very least, which institutions or institutional arenas are 
relevant is an empirical question that will vary depending on the political system 
of the country under consideration. Similarly, the definition of ideas is somewhat 
stipulative. Scholars have conceptualised the role of ideas in shaping policy in 
different ways, ranging from ‘frames’ to ‘paradigms’ (Hall 1992), or as focal 
points which enable decisions to be taken under conditions of uncertainty 
(Garrett 1993). In short, the societal approach fails to adequately explain why its 
definitions should be favoured over others. 
The new institutionalist critique 
 
The NIC perspective provides an important rebuttal to a number of the core 
claims of LI. The most important critique unifying scholars in this tradition is 
that shared norms, rooted in the EU as an institutional context, shaped the 
preferences of member governments during the eurozone crisis (Csehi and 
Puetter 2017). For example, Mitchell (2014) sees evidence of a powerful 
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European identity, while Laffan (2014) highlights a norm of responsibility to the 
collective, in shaping national preferences. Similarly, both new 
intergovernmentalism (Bickerton et al 2015) and deliberative 
intergovernmentalism (Puetter 2014) emphasise a commitment to consensus 
through ongoing dialogue between national governments. Equally, ‘discursive 
institutionalism’ underlines the importance of a shared policy discourse amongst 
EU member states (Schmidt 2013). 
 
An important limitation, however, is that the analyses on which these arguments 
are based draw principally on the experiences of euro area members. Even 
though scholars report strong evidence of shared norms, selection bias remains a 
possibility. To address this shortcoming, the causal effect of shared EU norms, 
collective identity, or a sense of solidarity in the formation of government 
preferences needs to be applied to the case of non-eurozone members. 
 
Theoretical expectations 
 
This article assesses these theoretical claims by analysing the UK’s role during 
the eurozone crisis. We select four cases to represent a cross-section of the crisis 
response over a three-year period: (1) emergency action (the Greek bailout in 
early 2010); (2) long-term measures to ensure the security of the Eurozone (the 
2011 negotiations to create a permanent bailout facility for the Eurozone – the 
European Stability Mechanism (ESM)); (3) the commitment to greater fiscal 
discipline (the Fiscal Compact negotiated by European leaders in late 2011); and 
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(4) the move towards Banking Union (the proposal to centralise the supervision 
of eurozone banks in 2011-12). 
 
With reference to the main theoretical perspectives outlined above, we specify 
the following empirical expectations:  
 
(1) LI holds that preferences will be shaped by domestic societal interests, 
mobilised according to issue-specific functional interdependence. Producer 
interests are typically expected to prevail. Applied to the UK during the eurozone 
crisis, LI would expect that the interests of the financial sector would be most 
likely to mobilise and translate into state preferences defended by the UK in 
intergovernmental negotiation. 
 
(2) The societal approach anticipates that governments adopt positions that are 
the foundation of economic groups’ competitive advantages, but that these cost-
benefit calculations can change rapidly, such as in response to economic crises 
(Schirm 2018: 65). It also predicts that government preferences will reflect path 
dependent and value-based collective expectations about ‘appropriate’ 
governmental policies. Applied to the UK, our expectation is that the government 
will seek to defend the position of the City of London; but that this will be 
circumscribed by long-standing beliefs – such as the primacy of the UK’s national 
sovereignty, and the idea of EMU as a flawed political project. 
 
(3) The NIC takes the view that member governments are subject to shared 
norms or interact in consensus-seeking institutional forums. Applied to the UK, 
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the expectation would be that the government would support measures that 
would safeguard the euro. The national interest would be superseded by, or 
identified in terms of, solidarity with eurozone members. 
 
(4) Old institutionalism is an approach that emphasises the importance of formal 
political institutions and procedures, and the relative autonomy of state actors 
from societal interests. As a highly centralised polity, we would therefore expect 
preference formation in the UK to be shaped by a small group of key actors 
located within the ‘core’ executive, close to the Prime Minister (PM) and the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer. 
 
We test these expectations by drawing on documentary sources, including the 
positions adopted by the main representatives of the finance sector: the 
Confederation of British Industry (CBI), CityUK and the British Banking 
Association, as well as original data from eight interviews conducted by the 
authors with UK politicians, senior civil servants, officials at the Bank of England, 
and institutions representing different sub-sectors of financial services. The civil 
servants interviewed were involved in the formation of UK government policy 
during key phases of the eurozone crisis. The interviews were semi-structured 
and included questions about the actors and processes involved in the formation 
of UK government policy. 
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The UK and the eurozone crisis 
 
Before we turn to the four case studies, we make two important contextual 
points. The first concerns the wider economic and political context. The financial 
and economic crisis hit the UK early and severely, before the intensification of 
market pressure in the eurozone. The Labour Government, led by PM Gordon 
Brown and Chancellor Alistair Darling, had responded decisively to prevent the 
spread of financial contagion in 2008. However, the general election of 6 June 
2010 produced a hung parliament. The Conservative Party and the Liberal 
Democrats immediately began talks to form a coalition government, but it was 
not until 10 June that Gordon Brown announced his resignation and on 11 June 
that the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition was formed, with David 
Cameron as PM.  
 
The second relates to the UK’s relationship with the EU. Although contestation of 
the European issue was a longstanding feature of British politics, opinion within 
Parliament became increasingly eurosceptic after 2010. The number of 
backbench Conservative MPs openly hostile to the EU increased significantly 
with the 2010 intake, and they became increasingly vocal with the emergence of 
the anti-EU UK Independence Party (UKIP) as a significant electoral force. As 
Conservative Party leader, Cameron had attempted to ignore the European issue 
but, after 2010, sought to neutralise the issue with the promise of a referendum 
‘lock’ on any further delegation of power to Brussels. However, as Tory 
eurosceptics became more vociferous, and UKIP’s electoral fortunes continued to 
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improve, he pledged in January 2013 to hold an in-out referendum on UK 
membership of the EU.  
 
Case study 1: The Greek Bail-Out 
 
In this first case, key decisions were made by a small circle of actors in a Labour 
government, motivated by concern for the wellbeing of the British economy and 
occasioned by EU and wider international pressure. UK preferences were not the 
result of mobilisation by societal interests, nor were they shaped by shared 
norms within a collective EU executive.  
 
When signs of economic trouble in Greece were initially detected in Whitehall in 
summer 2009, the UK government was concerned about the likely impact on the 
UK economy and weakened domestic banking sector in the event of European-
wide financial contagion (Darling 2011: 298). However, London did not think it 
should be financially liable for what it regarded as ‘the eurozone’s business’ 
(interview 7). The government believed that the single currency was a flawed 
project for which it bore no responsibility, and conscious that the UK had 
successfully navigated its way through the financial and economic crisis 
(interview 6). 
 
Although preoccupied with a domestic election and its own crisis response 
measures, the government recognised that periphery countries would need 
financial support to manage sovereign debt problems (interview 7).  The key 
decisions were taken by the PM in consultation with the Chancellor and HM 
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Treasury, and to a lesser extent the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) 
(interviews 4, 7). The PM and HMT were firmly against providing direct 
assistance to Greece, but the FCO was keen to demonstrate that the UK could be 
‘good partners’ and ‘show solidarity’ during the crisis (interview 6). Rather than 
provide financial assistance, it was therefore agreed that the UK should offer 
technical assistance to the Greek government – an offer, tellingly, that was never 
taken up (interview 5). 
 
At an informal summit of euro area heads of state in February 2010, member 
states were divided (Hodson 2015). The UK, with Sweden – also outside the euro 
area – wanted financial support for Greece to be channelled through the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), but was primarily concerned that the UK 
would not be financially liable for a bailout of Greece (interview 6). They were 
opposed by euro area member states, including France and Spain, who wanted a 
European response (Hodson 2015).  
 
The UK government reiterated its position at an IMF Executive Board discussion 
in April 2010 (interview 4), but the IMF demanded EU participation (Pisani-Ferry 
et al. 2013).There was also a developing consensus among euro area member 
states that a community response to the crisis in Greece was necessary 
(interviews 4, 7). Ways of financing support for Greece were discussed by the 
Eurogroup in early May 2010, and it was agreed that, in the absence of dedicated 
mechanisms to deal with such circumstances, the euro area would provide 
support under G7+1 that would be administered by the European Commission. 
Although the UK government disliked the associated institutional arrangements 
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because they required an arrangement outside the treaties -- a so-called 
‘Bangladesh agreement’, (interview 7) -- the UK joined the other member states 
in approving support to Greece and agreed to the Commission’s role as an 
administrator of the bailout package.  
 
The UK’s concern that it should not be financially liable lay behind its opposition 
to the Commission’s initial proposals for the creation of a European-level 
stabilisation fund with a lending capacity of around 500 billion euros (interview 
5). While the UK considered the scale of resources appropriate to what might be 
needed to stop contagion spreading to Greece, Portugal and possibly Spain, it 
was unprepared to accept the Commission’s proposal that the mechanism should 
be an EU budget facility. Appeals by the Commission for the UK to financially 
underwrite the currency through its own contributions were met with a strong 
rebuttal from the UK Chancellor (Darling 2011: 301). The UK also objected to use 
of Article 122(2) TFEU, allowing credit to be granted to a member state facing 
‘severe difficulties caused by natural disasters or exceptional occurrences 
beyond its control’, to assist a country facing balance of payments difficulties 
(interview 7).  
 
The EU, however, came under mounting pressure. The G7, and especially the US 
through Treasury Secretary, Timothy Geitner, insisted that the EU take 
immediate ‘shock and awe’ action to stem panic in European markets (Financial 
Times 2010). Following an acrimonious twelve-hour meeting of the ECOFIN 
Council on 9-10 May 2010, the UK reluctantly agreed to a loan agreement with 
Greece and the creation of a stabilisation fund composed of two elements 
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(interview 7). The EFSF was to be a fund of 440 billion euros guaranteed by the 
eurozone countries alone, but the UK was concerned that euro area countries 
would not be able to raise the guarantees they needed, which would leave the UK 
liable for a maximum of 6.6 billion euros under the EFSM (interview 6), a 60 
billion euro facility guaranteed by the EU budget (Pisani-Ferry et al. 2013:17). 
 
Despite the UK’s strong reservations, there was an awareness in London that, 
since decisions under Article 122 (2) were taken by QMV, ‘the UK could not block 
it’ (interview 6). The decision also came at a difficult time for the UK. Since a new 
government had not yet been formed, the outgoing Labour Chancellor 
represented the UK in the negotiations (Darling 2011: 298). Although he had 
cleared the decision not to vote against with future Chancellor, George Osborne 
and a key figure in coalition talks, Vince Cable,1 the precise terms of the 
conversation became controversial: first, when the new PM David Cameron 
criticized Darling and Labour on the grounds that the UK was potentially liable, 
and second when eurosceptic MPs John Redwood and Douglas Carswell, who 
strongly opposed any UK liability for problems in the eurozone, used it as 
political capital (House of Commons 2010). 
 
Case study 2: The European Stabilisation Mechanism 
 
In autumn 2010, the UK was becoming increasingly frustrated by the EU’s failure 
to provide a lasting solution to break the ‘doom loop’ that had taken hold 
 
1 Cited from official note of the conversation (interview 5). 
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between banks and sovereigns in the eurozone: ‘We were worried that fire from 
the burning house would spread to the UK’, one senior official recalled 
(interview 7). The UK tried to persuade Chancellor Angela Merkel and the 
President of the European Central Bank (ECB), Jean-Claude Trichet, to allow 
member states to borrow at more attractive rates, but both were reluctant 
(interview 5). The US and China also made clear their views that the eurozone 
needed an enlarged bailout fund or commitment by the ECB that it would enable 
a ‘lender of last resort’ function (Reuters 2010).   
 
Although Trichet rejected any idea that the ECB would become a lender of last 
resort, the Deauville compromise – a bilateral agreement negotiated by 
Chancellor Angela Merkel and President Nicolas Sarkozy in October 2010 – 
cleared the way to an enlarged ESM (Howarth and Quaglia 2016: 168). However, 
the UK government was concerned by Germany’s insistence that an enlarged 
stabilisation fund would require amendment of the treaty (interview 7). Even 
though the simplified revision procedure under Article 136(3) would apply, 
Cameron would have to navigate the amendment through the House of 
Commons, where the 2010 intake of Conservative MPs was markedly more 
eurosceptic (House of Commons 2010: 4-6). Moreover, although the 
Conservatives had formed a coalition agreement with the Liberal Democrats, 
Cameron had tried to appease the eurosceptic wing of his party with a legislative 
commitment to hold a referendum in the event of any proposal to transfer 
further powers to the EU (Financial Times 2010). The appointment of veteran 
eurosceptic MP, Bill Cash, as chair of the EU select committee in the House of 
Commons, intensified scrutiny of the government. 
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On 28-29 October, the European Council (2010) agreed on the need to establish 
a ‘permanent crisis mechanism to safeguard the financial stability of the euro 
area as a whole’. Cameron’s focus was on securing a quid pro quo for the political 
risk he would be taking. However, attempts by the UK government to leverage a 
deal on the EU budget or to use an amendment of the treaty to return selected 
powers to the member states gained no traction (interview 6). Cameron 
managed eventually to secure an understanding that, once the ESM was in place, 
the EFSM would no longer be used for bailouts of eurozone member states 
(European Council 2010a). As one UK official noted: ‘That was the big prize for 
us. To ensure that the ESM could come into play and stop the use of the EU 
budget’ (Interview 6). Cameron was able to announce to Parliament that: ‘Britain 
is not in the euro and we are not going to join the euro, and that is why we 
should not have any liability for bailing out the eurozone when the new 
permanent arrangements come into effect’ (Gov.UK 2010).  
 
The amendments won at the December 2010 European Council enabled 
Cameron to argue that he had fixed a problem inherited from his predecessors. 
He could also argue that the ESM was not a temporary guarantee, but an IMF-
styled fund with increased financial firepower to safeguard stability – ‘real cash 
which could be borrowed against’ (interview 2). As the PM underlined, ‘enabling 
eurozone countries to establish such a mechanism is in our interests’ (Gov.uk 
2010). Even if the negotiations on a permanent stabilisation fund had forced the 
UK government to risk bringing a treaty revision before parliament, the final 
agreement on the ESM solved the problems created by the EFSM. 
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In this second case, there was again no evidence of extensive lobbying by 
powerful societal interests, including the City of London. Financial industry 
lobby groups certainly produced several reports on the eurozone crisis and the 
implications of reform.2 But, as a senior regulator noted, these carried little 
weight within government because ‘they did not pay enough attention to what 
was politically realistic, or what the intentions of the key players were going to 
be’ (interview 5). As a consequence, ‘the City was quite weak in terms of its 
ability to influence the government’s position’ (interview 2).  
 
There is also little evidence that the UK’s position was shaped by shared norms: 
rather, the UK’s main priority was to insulate its economy from eurozone 
contagion. The UK position was defined by a Conservative PM and Chancellor 
who enjoyed significant autonomy to shape EU policy during the twelve-month 
‘honeymoon period’ of the Coalition Government (interview 2). This began to 
change in the second half of 2011 as it became clear that the sovereign debt 
crisis could not be contained in Greece. Although the government easily secured 
parliamentary approval for the ESM, it also triggered backbench opposition from 
a more Eurosceptic intake of MPs, hostile to any financial liability for bailing out 
eurozone members. 
 
 
 
 
2 For example, ‘Balance of Competences Review – Economic and Monetary Policy’, International 
Regulatory Strategy Group, 10 July 2014; ‘Eurozone Caucusing: A challenge to the European 
single market?', British Bankers' Association, June 2014. 
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Case study 3. The Fiscal Compact  
 
As economic conditions in the Eurozone deteriorated in 2011, London’s attempts 
to remain detached from the crisis were increasingly thwarted. Neither Osborne 
nor Cameron wavered from the view they formed in May 2010 that the 
‘eurozone crisis is bad for us’ (Interview 5). But fourteen months later, Osborne 
signalled a shift in UK strategy by endorsing the ‘remorseless logic’ of monetary 
union (Financial Times 2011). By accepting the need for fiscal union, Osborne’s 
intervention reversed the UK’s longstanding opposition to a two-speed Europe. 
This about-turn was prompted by a deepening frustration at the ad hoc 
responses of the eurozone countries to the crisis, and failure to address 
underlying deficiencies in the single currency’s design (House of Commons 2013: 
35-42). The speech was spearheaded by HMT and the PM, who regarded 
financial stability as the main priority, and believed that the UK could not 
legitimately try to shape further eurozone integration if it was not willing to 
participate (interview 4). It met some resistance from the FCO, concerned that 
official acceptance of a two-speed Europe would undermine UK diplomacy by no 
longer having a ‘seat at the table’ (interview 4). 
 
In November 2011, the government secured support for a bailout to Ireland, 
even though it drew on the controversial EUR 60 billion facility agreed in May 
(Financial Times 2011). The government was also able to extend a bilateral loan 
of £7 billion as part of an international rescue package to the UK’s nearest 
neighbour. To the surprise of some in Whitehall, the measure passed smoothly 
through Parliament (interview 4). To secure approval, however, Osborne had 
 20 
pledged that the UK would not participate in any permanent bailout mechanism 
for euro area countries (Financial Times 2010). 
 
The worsening crisis in 2011, and continuing lack of decisive action by eurozone 
states, reduced the UK government’s room for manoeuvre by fuelling 
euroscepticism in Parliament and in the country (interview 7). The UK chose to 
remain largely on the sidelines. It was not involved in any of the Euro Summits in 
2011, and was not a signatory to agreements strengthening economic 
governance, such as the Euro Plus Pact (Hodson 2012).  
 
When Portugal requested assistance in spring 2011, however, the UK supported 
the use of the EFSM and briefly contemplated a bilateral loan (Gov.uk 2011). 
While a parliamentary vote was not necessary, the measure had to be presented 
to the European Scrutiny Committee in the House of Commons where it met 
significant opposition. In July 2011, as the crisis threatened to engulf Italy and 
Spain, Conservative eurosceptics joined with Labour MPs to vote against 
increased funding for the IMF on the grounds that British taxpayers’ money 
would be used to bail out the euro and the UK would be complicit in imposing 
austerity on Greece (House of Lords 2012). The rebellion came as a shock to the 
government, which had assumed that there would be cross-party support on IMF 
involvement (interview 4). Shortly afterwards, in September 2011, around 100 
Conservative MPs signed an Early Day Motion calling for a discussion on the 
eurozone crisis and a referendum on the Lisbon Treaty (Hodson 2012: 189-190).  
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Under increasing pressure from Parliament, Cameron sought to turn the 
eurozone crisis to his advantage by seeking to leverage the prospect of EU treaty 
reform to repatriate powers to member states (Thompson 2017). As announced 
by Foreign Secretary William Hague to Parliament in October 2011, the 
government’s top priority would be to ‘protect the rights’ of countries outside 
the euro area, and to secure protections to ‘prevent damage’ to the financial 
services industry (House of Commons Debate 2011).  The opportunity appeared 
much sooner than expected when Germany called for a treaty change to adopt 
measures that later became the Fiscal Compact.  
 
Cameron met Chancellor Merkel to press his own demands for an amendment 
that would redefine the UK’s relationship with the EU. Having been advised by 
the Legal Service of the Council that ratification by all 27 member states was 
required, Cameron believed the government had negotiating power (interview 
5). When he was rebuffed, he tried at the December 2011 European Council to 
secure a veto over future EU financial regulation, but when this effort failed, the 
PM vetoed treaty reform, forcing EU leaders to agree the Fiscal Compact in the 
form of an intergovernmental treaty. Although welcomed enthusiastically by 
eurosceptics at home, the veto undermined the government’s attempt to reset 
UK-EU relations (House of Commons 2013: 20-31). 
 
The UK veto was widely interpreted at the time as a defence of the interests of 
the City of London. In reality, our interviewees argued that the preferences of the 
UK government were out of step with the financial industry. The City was not 
consulted on the ‘wishlist’ of special protections demanded by the government in 
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its name, and resented becoming a ‘poster child for the December veto’ 
(interview 2). Senior industry figures regarded Cameron’s strategy as ‘caustic’, 
since it would damage London’s standing as a financial centre, and told Treasury 
ministers that the UK’s demands were ‘misguided or unnecessary and liable to 
backfire’ (Financial Times 2012). Leading figures argued that the UK needed to 
‘embrace’ greater EU regulatory harmonisation to ensure London remained 
Europe’s main financial centre (TheCityUK 2014).  
 
Moreover, the City interpreted Cameron’s demands for a UK veto over future EU 
regulation as an attempt to defend the autonomy of financial regulators, not the 
interests of the financial industry.  According to an internal City report: ‘The 
protocol would not have protected the City and appears rather to be an attempt 
to protect HMT’s view of how the City should be regulated by national 
authorities with wide discretionary powers, unhindered by EU rules…If it were 
to be accepted by other member states it might actually damage the City’ 
(TheCityUK 2014). Similarly, a senior Treasury official confirmed that the UK’s 
priority was to defend taxpayers and the tougher prudential rules introduced in 
the wake of the banking crisis: ‘We wanted to maintain as much control and 
supervision over the City as possible… which the City disliked since UK 
authorities may be stricter’ (interview 2). This led City lobby groups to mobilise 
alongside their French and German counterparts against the UK government in 
support of the Commission’s proposal for the maximum harmonisation of EU 
bank capital standards.  It provoked Sharon Bowles, then Chair of the Economic 
and Monetary Affairs Committee in the European Parliament, to suggest that the 
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UK government was actually seeking ‘protection of taxpayers from the City’ 
(quoted in Schelkle 2016: 160). 
 
In this third case, the mobilisation of societal interests was again largely absent 
as a driver of preferences. The City of London was not even consulted in advance 
of the December 2011 summit on the list of special protections that Cameron 
demanded on its behalf. Rather, the UK’s position was decided by the PM and the 
Chancellor, both of whom wanted a long-term solution to the eurozone crisis. 
The government’s room for manoeuvre was, however, increasingly limited by 
both Parliament and the Bank of England. Despite its policy reversal on the 
eurozone, which seemed to betoken a new solidarity with members of the euro 
area, the UK government continued to prioritise the defence of UK regulatory 
autonomy from potential encroachment from new eurozone institutions. 
 
Case study 4: Banking Union 
 
Banking Union highlights the interconnectedness of the EU single market and the 
eurozone. Although outside the euro area (Schelkle 2016; Thompson 2017), the 
UK was home to the largest financial centre in the EU and transacted the bulk of 
euro-denominated trading in derivatives. This made it difficult for the UK 
government to remain aloof. 
 
Banking Union presented an opportunity for the Cameron government to play a 
more positive role, and thus repair some of the damage from the December 2011 
summit. It ‘helped a bit with the feeling that we were trying to wreck the 
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[eurozone] project’ (interview 7). The UK had long argued that the eurozone 
needed to do more to address the fragility of its banking system (Howarth and 
Quaglia 2016). Germany signalled willingness to consider using the ESM to 
recapitalise the banks, but also wanted stronger centralised supervision in the 
euro area. This presented the UK with a difficult choice. On the one hand, 
Banking Union risked fragmenting the single market, encouraging caucusing of 
‘ins’ against ‘outs’, and creating powerful new agencies in Frankfurt that could 
come to dominate EU decision making on banking issues. On the other, 
opposition risked contributing to the crisis and forcing the EU into strengthening 
the European Banking Authority by converting it into a single supervisor for the 
entire EU – the UK included. 
 
The UK eventually settled in favour of euro area Banking Union, reflecting the 
prevailing views of senior figures within the Treasury and Bank of England. 
From their perspective, the ECB should serve as the single supervisor because 
the largest under-capitalised banks were located predominantly within the euro 
area. Although full membership was ruled out, there was ‘some consideration’ in 
the Treasury about whether the UK could have some form of ‘associate or 
cooperative membership’. But the Chancellor and the Bank Governor recognised 
that this ‘just wasn’t going to work’ given the size of the UK financial sector and 
the terms of the domestic debate on Europe. 
 
The City supported Banking Union as it would contribute to financial stability, 
and welcomed the UK government’s determination to safeguard against future 
eurozone caucusing (BBA 2014). But this masked internal divisions over what 
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the UK’s relationship with the new Banking Union should be. Large parts of the 
industry ‘had a more relaxed view of shared sovereignty’, feared the implications 
of a UK veto over a single European supervisor, and preferred the UK to be 
actively engaged in shaping eurozone integration ‘from within’ (Financial Times 
2012). Some prominent UK banks went so far as to advocate full UK membership 
of Banking Union on the grounds that centralised supervision would reduce 
compliance costs, and might even be based on ‘lower standards’ (interview 5). 
But this position was firmly resisted by senior regulators: ‘Some people in the 
City said, somewhat surprisingly, that the UK should be part of the Banking 
Union. But we were always very clear that we could not be in a position where 
we were handing supervision of our banks to an entity that we were not in 
control of. So that was a non-starter and became a defensive issue for us’ 
(interview 2).  
 
As in the previous three cases, financial industry lobbying had little impact in 
shaping the UK’s position. A minister at the time commented that the City ‘was 
backward in coming forward’, reflecting the diversity of perspectives from 
different parts of the sector. Moreover, the City took its own importance ‘for 
granted’, assuming that financial industry preferences were shared by UK 
ministers (interview 6).  
 
Despite the UK’s decision not to join, an official closely involved in the 
negotiations revealed that ‘behind the scenes’, the UK ‘played a very significant 
part in helping to think through how this could be designed’ (interview, June 
2018). In the negotiations, the UK secured a number of concessions, including 
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the principle of non-discrimination and the exclusion of Central Counterparty 
(CCP) supervision. But its key concern was to address the risk of future eurozone 
caucusing within the EBA, which could lead to the UK being permanently 
outvoted. The UK challenged the Commission’s initial proposals for revising the 
EBA’s voting procedures, and instead proposed the use of ‘double majority 
decision making’ to require a majority of both members and non-members of the 
Single Supervisory Mechanism. Although it secured an agreement along these 
lines in December 2012, it was a further twelve months before the Commission 
finally accepted the UK’s proposal. 
 
In this case, the UK government offered conditional support. Cameron insisted 
that Banking Union should be a eurozone-only entity, with bank supervision 
centralised under the ECB (rather than the EBA). The UK’s position therefore 
reinforced the logic of variable geometry that Osborne’s ‘remorseless logic’ 
speech had explicitly endorsed. Interests in the City were broadly sympathetic, 
although many of the largest financial firms would have preferred an even closer 
attachment. However, neither Conservative MPs, nor the Bank of England, were 
willing to countenance the prospect of the City being supervised from Brussels 
or Frankfurt.  There is also little evidence that UK preferences were shaped by 
shared norms within an EU setting. Rather, the UK was first and foremost 
concerned to protect the UK economy by facilitating strengthened eurozone 
governance. Nonetheless, once the UK’s conditions had been met, it was willing 
to play a more constructive role (albeit in private) by providing technical 
assistance to the Commission in designing Banking Union.   
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Findings and discussion 
 
The UK’s approach to the eurozone crisis challenges theoretical expectations on 
both sides of the debate. Contrary to LI, the positions adopted by the UK were 
not simply derived from long-standing preferences that were transmitted by 
powerful economic interests, then aggregated by government. The City was 
certainly important in shaping UK preferences during the eurozone crisis, but 
not in the way specified by the LI. We point to three findings. First, there is little 
evidence that the UK financial industry lobbied extensively around any of the 
four issues examined in the paper. Instead, City lobby groups made a conscious 
decision to remain on the sidelines. Second, while UK government preferences 
reflected the underlying interests of the financial sector with respect to the 
Greek bailout and the ESM, perversely this was from a position of economic 
vulnerability, not strength. In other words, the City’s influence reflected its 
exposure to eurozone banks and as a potential transmission mechanism for 
contagion to the wider UK economy. Third, on the issue of further eurozone 
integration, the UK government’s preferences either lacked support from the 
City (e.g. non-participation in Banking Union) or were heavily criticised (e.g. 
Cameron’s demands for special protections for the City).  
 
Our explanation of this is twofold. First, during the early phase of the eurozone 
crisis (2010-11), the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition was able to 
develop its preferences autonomously. UK preferences were developed within 
government by senior ministers and officials close to the Prime Minister and the 
Chancellor. Few other government ministers were involved, Parliament showed 
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little interest, and domestic interests had not mobilised (interviews 1, 2). 
However, as eurozone contagion spread and attention turned to more 
fundamental reform, such as the ESM, Fiscal Compact and Banking Union, the 
autonomy of this small group became circumscribed as new groups mobilised 
around the issue. In particular, the concerns of the financial industry were 
frequently ‘crowded out’ by more pressing demands from powerful political and 
institutional interests.  Specifically, the role of backbench Conservative MPs, 
frequently allied with Labour MPs, was critical in constraining the government’s 
capacity to agree to any further transfer of power or financial resources to the 
eurozone. Similarly, the influence of the Bank of England was felt in the Banking 
Union when it demanded special protections to ensure that UK regulators 
retained authority to regulate the City. 
 
Moreover, the UK’s position changed over time. The government continued to re-
adjust its position in response to pressures from the EU level. During the early 
phase of the crisis, the UK government sought to distance itself. However, once it 
became clear that the UK would not be isolated from the effects of the crisis, it 
feared direct contagion. The UK government was also aware that the EU’s failure 
to take decisive action was fuelling rising euroscepticism at home. This domestic 
vulnerability was an important driver of Osborne’s attempt to recast UK-EU 
relations through his endorsement of the ‘remorseless logic’ of euro area 
integration.  
 
This strategy was undermined, however, by the increasing activism of 
Parliament. In an effort to manage these political pressures, Cameron sought to 
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exploit the crisis by trying to extract, first, a treaty amendment to repatriate 
powers, and second, specific protections for a key UK economic sector. His 
failure to do so, which was exposed at the 2011 summit, undermined the UK’s 
reputation with EU leaders by appearing to place the narrow interests of the 
financial sector above the survival of the eurozone. On Banking Union, it was in 
the UK’s interests to play a positive role, given the exposure of the City to the fate 
of euro area banks. But, given an increasingly hostile political climate, this had to 
be done privately and away from parliamentary scrutiny. The goodwill 
generated helped the UK to secure a significant, if ultimately short-lived, victory 
over the EBA’s voting procedures. 
 
UK preference formation and position taking also contest the NIC contention that 
government responses to the Eurozone crisis can be explained in terms of a 
European preference, shared norms or values, or deliberative institutionalism. 
Although the UK expressed a desire that the EU take the necessary measures to 
ensure the stability of the eurozone, it did so primarily out of concern for the 
British economy. The UK was motivated more by economic self-interest and 
domestic political calculation than solidarity with its EU partners. Its support for 
EU action to safeguard the eurozone was strictly limited, especially in the early 
phases of the crisis when London’s main concern was to limit UK liability: ‘We 
did not want the eurozone to fail, but at the same time we did not want to pay for 
it’ (interview 7).  
 
Only to the extent that the UK sought to defend the rights of the single market as 
a whole, and the interests of the other euro-outs, could it claim to be acting on 
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the basis of solidarity. As the institutional architecture of the euro area was 
reformed and recast, the UK grew increasingly marginalized as a euro out. It 
became increasingly concerned about the spillover of fiscal, financial and 
banking matters into eurozone territory, especially when its insistence on a strict 
division of labour between the Eurogroup and ECOFIN proved difficult to 
sustain, not least because of its interests as a contributor to the programmes 
supporting Ireland and Portugal. Moreover, evidence of solidarity amongst euro-
outs is hard to find. The UK did seek to strengthen ties with other ‘outs’, 
particularly Poland and Sweden, on the issue of Banking Union (interview 2), 
and Cameron spent considerable time trying to cultivate relations with 
Chancellor Merkel in Germany (interview 4). But the strategy ultimately failed. 
Although the UK wanted to safeguard its interests from euro caucusing, other 
non-members who regarded themselves as ‘pre-ins’, but also Denmark and 
Sweden, saw this as less of a problem. The decision by many ‘outs’ to join the 
EU’s strengthened economic governance arrangements, including the Fiscal 
Compact and Banking Union, exposed the UK as an outlier. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The above examination of how the UK formulated its position to how the EU 
should respond to the eurozone crisis contributes to the debate on how national 
approaches are best theorised in three ways. First, it underlines the importance 
of understanding national responses not as a single event, but as multiple 
strands. By demonstrating that the same government can approach different 
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elements of eurozone reform very differently, it challenges the assumption that 
there is a single explanandum when examining national responses to the crisis. 
 
Second, the UK case illustrates a shortcoming of LI that has not been reflected in 
recent literature on the eurozone crisis. Although there has been intense debate 
on the relative status of preferences and positions, the conceptualisation of 
preference formation as a society-led process has not so far been questioned. 
Since UK positions were often decided by a small circle of top politicians in the 
absence of significant interest group mobilisation, the UK case demonstrates that 
LI has limited explanatory purchase in countries where the state can act with 
greater autonomy from societal interests. The main constraints on the UK 
government were imposed by political (Parliament) and bureaucratic (UK 
regulators) interests, which is not foreseen by LI.  
 
Taken together, these two findings support the argument made above that an 
account of preference formation needs to be sensitive to state-society relations, 
different models of interest intermediation, and the respective power and 
resources of domestic political institutions. These variables, which are core to 
the old institutionalism, are absent from LI. In the latter’s pared-down 
conception of the domestic arena, which reflects the flawed premises of classic 
pluralism, the only actors are societal interests and the state executive. Such a 
limited conceptualisation of the domestic setting does not capture the factors 
that the UK case have shown to be important, nor does it provide a basis for 
understanding or explaining cross-national differences. 
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Third, the UK case provides a counter-example to the NIC of LI. Although critics 
have argued powerfully that member state preferences in regard to the eurozone 
crisis were shaped by shared norms and interaction within EU institutions, 
evidence has hitherto been drawn from euro area members. The UK case shows 
that membership of the eurozone area may be an important scope condition. 
 
The article thereby advances the central aim of the special issue. As well as 
problematizing preferences and preference formation, it has contributed an 
additional country case study, and suggested new avenues for future theorising. 
We conclude that focusing on the ‘old institutionalism’ of formal institutions, 
procedures and power within polities can provide important added value when 
seeking to explain variation in national government responses to the eurozone 
crisis. 
 
The findings draw on research conducted as part of ‘EMU Choices’, funded under the 
EU Horizon 2020 programme, grant agreement No. 649532. 
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